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Over the last few years, I have attended several political meetings concerned with the refugee
crisis, multiculturalism or Indigenous rights in Australia, meetings at which liberal
democratic–minded ‘left-wing’ people came together to discuss, or agitate for change in,
governmental policies. At these meetings, I always found it difficult to accept the slogans on
their placards and in their speeches: ‘Shame Australia! Reconciliation for a united Australia’,
‘Wake up Australia! We welcome refugees!’ or ‘True Australians are tolerant! Let’s celebrate
multicultural Australia!’ My uncomfortable feeling came not only from the fact that I was left
out because of my Japanese nationality but also because I had never seen or heard words like
‘shame Japan’, ‘wake up Japan’ or ‘true Japanese are …’ at Japanese ‘left-wing’ political gather-
ings. In Japan, these are words used only by right-wing nationalists. Indeed it is difficult to
even imagine liberal-left intellectuals in postwar Japan calling for a ‘true Japanese’ political
response (as if such a response was positive), such is the extent to which the idea of ‘good
nationalism’ is now regarded as an oxymoron. This is my starting point for an essay in which
I want to be attentive to the different roles played by national(ism) in the Japanese and Aus-
tralian political environments.1
A brief history of japanese pearl-shellers in australia
The history of Japanese pearl-shellers in northern Australia has been studied by both Aus-
tralian and Japanese historians since the late 1970s.2 The collecting and trading of pearl-
shells in northern Australia has gone on for as long as Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders
have been in the region.3 However, the colonial pearl-shell industry began in the 1860s. When
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discussion about the development of regional governments within England itself as part of
the wider process of devolution of the United Kingdom to recognise the ways in which such
displays, such aestheticisations, reflect a de-contextualisation and often de-politicisation
of ‘Britishness’.42 Indeed Stratton argues that in promoting the notion that Australia’s heritage
lies in England, Ireland, Scotland and Wales, Britfest deconstructs what it wishes to promote,
the existence of ‘British folkways’, and points to the ‘cultural recolonisation [of Ireland in
particular] under the apparently benign intention of ethnic formation’.43
In this respect, organisers cannot be oblivious to the effects of attempts to assert British
or English ethnicity. One wonders how conscious they are of the ways, as Stratton puts it,
that particular and positive claims about the role of the British or English in Australia’s
settlement are often heard as nationalist claims for the primacy of an Anglo-Celtic heritage—
which in turn easily slips into a reassertion of the racial superiority of Anglo-Saxon Australia.
And how all of this, as Stratton also points out, ‘ultimately, works in the broadest context of
Australia’s long history of the White Australia policy which promoted and privileged the
ideology of a white race which for members of groups such as National Action, is by no means
defunct’.44 But while function and effect cannot be ignored, we suggest that it would be mis-
leading and reductive to describe a conscious agenda of organisers and participants at Britfest;
the less formal or ‘dialogic’ expressions of Britishness that the festival embraces are ambi-
guous, contradictory and shifting.
Perhaps the biggest contradiction, or at least ambiguity, at Britfest is that the festival
fails to represent what has shifted: it fails to represent a migrant community. There is no sense
of a history of movement in the formal displays at Britfest. The event occurs ostensibly because
of an association based on the fact of settlement in Frankston and Australia; Britfest does not
represent the fact that this meeting on the Frankston oval is a result of many journeys.
Britfest certainly prompted some of those interviewed to see it as a public space that largely
ignores their autobiographical tracks. (In this respect Britfest is not unlike many other public
and performative spaces in Australia, which ignore comings and goings, and the relation-
ships of a place coming into being.) The festival has, it appears, failed to publicly acknow-
ledge and celebrate what is important to its local audience, which isn’t ‘the Jack’ (or Britishness
as a coherent and stable entity or field of influence) but the more intimate meetings and
gestures that make up their ongoing journey of migration, of being placed. Learning to track
not just the Jack but a series of relationships, not least that between Britishness and Aus-
tralianness, and to recognise the ways in which these meeting places are never empty but a
palimpsest of past movements is crucial to understanding any sense of migrant identity in
Australia. Without wishing to claim too much for British migrants in the Melbourne suburb
of Frankston, most are keenly aware of the fact that this display of Britishness takes place on
an Australian Rules ground.
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did not challenge what the festival presented to them, neither did they embrace its mes-
sage with a deep seriousness. If we think of the organisers of Britfest as ventriloquists of
Britishness—trying to make Britishness speak38—the festival appeared to say little to those
assembled to listen.
Although the British-born population in Frankston and Australia as a whole is ageing, it
is unlikely that the audience could identify beyond any superficial level with the ‘ethno-
graphic other’ presented to them at Britfest. Beefeaters, ‘bobbies’, morris dancers, Punch and
Judy, Queen Victoria and the Varangian Guard all appear rather arcane, or cartoonish, if
indeed they are familiar at all (and they would not be for many of those second- and third-
generation migrants accompanying parents and grandparents). The first-time appearance of
a Varangian Guard at Britfest 2001, for example, provides a case in point, and perhaps one
sign of the attempt at ethnic agency for which Stratton argues. This reference to an East
Roman (Byzantine) imperial fighting unit, containing increasing numbers of displaced Anglo-
Saxons until it eventually became known as the English Guard, represents freedoms lost and
still denied. But illustrative of the preservation of ancestry through the tradition of practice,
the Varangian Guard re-creation re-enacts and asserts ideas of heritage and identity that
are more a reflection of the interests of the organising committee than of British migrants
as a whole in Frankston or Melbourne, let alone Australia.
Interviews reveal that many of those who attended and participated in Britfest understand
their Britishness—or Welshness, Irishness, Englishness or Scottishness—in quite differ-
ent, more immediate, more contemporary and probably more transitional or at least trans-
national ways.39 By contrast, the presentation of traditional symbols of Britishness for their
own sake at Britfest served to de-contextualise and render them ahistorical: forms of British-
ness were celebrated as if, in the words of Stuart Hall, they contained ‘within themselves,
from their moment of origin, some fixed and unchanging value or meaning’.40 But under-
standings of Queen Victoria and the British police force are as diverse as they are positional.
Those migrants who enjoy watching their twice-weekly instalments of The Bill, re-runs of
Prime Suspect, Silent Witness and Inspectors Morse and Frost, realise that the ‘British bobby’,
let alone British crime, isn’t all it used to be.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of Britfest is that while there are valid and import-
ant reasons for thinking about the meanings of Britishness in Australia, there was a striking
absence of representations of the Australian context in which this supposedly uniquely united
identity was formed. In other words, the performance of ethnic identity referred exclusively
to pre-migratory forms of cultural expression, to a displaced and generalised ethnographic
display. As Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett has argued, such ‘programs … generally represent
an imagined community in which diversity is harmoniously integrated, where difference is
reduced to style and decoration, to spice of life’.41 One only needs to consider current
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fishing beds of pearl-shells were ‘found’ near Broome and Thursday Island these places
experienced sudden development as fishery ports. One may think it was the ‘pearl’ as an
ornament they were after, but it was the ‘shell’, a popular material for the button industry in
Europe since the 1850s. At first, the colonial fishery industry used Indigenous Australians
and Malays as manual labourers to collect pearl-shells, but workers were in serious short
supply. During this time, Japan went through the Meiji Restoration and abandoned its national
isolation policy. As a result, Japanese labour migrants began to arrive in northern Australia.
In 1876, Kojiro Nonami from Shimane prefecture was recorded as the first Japanese pearl-
shell worker to arrive on Thursday Island.4 From the 1880s, labour migration from Japan
to Thursday Island and Broome became constant. With Australia producing, at one point,
80 per cent of pearl-shells in the world, even the introduction of the White Australia Policy
in 1901 did not halt the flow of Japanese migrant labourers. According to the statistics, there
were about 1200 Japanese in Broome and 600 Japanese on Thursday Island in July 1919.5
The pearl-shell industry peaked in the early years of the twentieth century. While the First
World War had a negative effect on the pearl-shell market, the most destructive impact
was caused by the Second World War. When Japan declared war against the USA in 1941,
Australia was allied with the Americans and most Japanese in Australia were detained.6
Furthermore, all fishing boats were either impounded by the navy or destroyed. After the
war, Japanese immigration was restricted until 1953 when some thirty Japanese were finally
permitted to enter Australia and start work in Broome again. The indenture of 106 Okinawans
was permitted in 1958 as well. Okinawa was an American mandated territory at that time,
which justified the arrival of Okinawans in Australia.7 However, even though there was a
short recovery, the pearl-shell industry practically came to an end in the 1960s.
The question at the centre of this article is this: are Japanese people responsible for the
colonial exploitation of Indigenous Australians, their lands and waters? In a more general
sense, what are the ‘global implications’ of the colonial past and postcolonial present of Aus-
tralia? Finally I want to consider how these questions are they related to the process of Abori-
ginal reconciliation.
Reading the australian declaration towards reconciliation
In 2000, the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation presented the Australian Declaration
Towards Reconciliation (hereafter, Australian Declaration), consisting of eleven paragraphs and
twelve sentences.8 It begins: ‘We, the peoples of Australia, of many origins as we are, make
a commitment to go on together in a spirit of reconciliation’. It continues by acknowledging
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders as the original owners of this country, and that they
—
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As a strange intra-ethnic form of ‘prescribed otherness’,36 the UKSA may actually be
articulating not so much the category British but the category Australian, or rather the pri-
macy of Britishness within the category Australian, and the power of British and Aus-
tralian identities to shape and define each other. We might understand the use of an event
such as Britfest then—especially with regard to arguments made by Hage that a sense that
being ‘white Australian’ no longer automatically yields the national privileges or opportu-
nities once perceived to have existed—as re-articulating a concept of the British roots
upon which Australian identity was supposed to be grafted. Britfest is thus a claim by a group
of British-born and Anglophile Australians that there should be no crisis of identification or
undermining of Australia’s ‘core’ culture. It may be an unsettled rather than a confident asser-
tion, but it is an assertion nonetheless. And it is this brazenness that in many ways dis-
comforts those more settled (Anglo-)Australians who might fear or simply see as irrelevant
a public viewing of the ethnic/cultural markers of the so-called mainstream. Transnational
identification can interrogate the privileged homogeneity of the nation-state. Britfest, then,
may open spaces where membership of Australia’s core culture is less certain, and raise ques-
tions that are met with unsettled or ambivalent feelings.
The most obvious, and perhaps surprising, way in which this occurs is how the audience
responds to and reconstructs Britfest. As Robert Lavenda states in relation to North American
community festivals, once a festival begins there is the potential for it to take on a life of its
own, to develop a ‘dialogic potential’. ‘The festival, both text and action, becomes public
property’, Paul Ricoeur has argued, ‘creating a public culture’.37 In this respect, the ‘dialogic
potential’ of Britfest was clearly manifest in the importance that the different groups within
the UKSA attributed to various events and stalls. For many UKSA branch members, the sig-
nificance of the day seemed to lie more in its possibilities for social interactions (the dancing,
the meeting with friends and acquaintances), than in the official function of celebrating or
marketing Britishness. The (symbolic) cannon firing impressed no-one.
The public culture of Britfest as created and encountered by those not formally affiliated
with the UKSA is harder to ascertain. Nevertheless, observation, interviews and impromptu
conversations both at and after the festival suggested that many attendees were rather bemused
by the event. They generally responded to the British products on sale and the self-conscious
British displays and activities with (largely amused) irony. Even invited dignitaries such as
consular representatives, the mayor of the municipality and local members of parliament
appeared to feel that the most appropriate tone for their speeches should be playful rather
than sombre, regionally parochial rather than nationalistic or patriotic. Few of the audience
ventured into the middle of the oval to participate in the dancing and other events, prefer-
ring to observe the proceedings from the grandstand. Certainly, if those attending Britfest
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were colonised without treaty or consent. After affirming the fact that their traditional customs
and beliefs have survived until today, there follows four sentences about historical recog-
nition and the ‘nation’:
Our nation must have the courage to own the truth, to heal the wounds of its past so that
we can move on together at peace with ourselves.
Reconciliation must live in the hearts and minds of all Australians. Many steps have been
taken, many steps remain as we learn our shared histories.
As we walk the journey of healing, one part of the nation apologises and expresses its sor-
row and sincere regret for the injustices of the past, so the other part accepts the apologies
and forgives.
The Australian Declaration then gestures towards a future in which all Australians enjoy
their rights at the same time as Indigenous people hold their right of self-determination, and
ends hoping for ‘a united Australia’: ‘Our hope is for a united Australia that respects this land
of ours; values the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander heritage; and provides justice and
equity for all’.
Reading the Australian Declaration, it seems to me that the purpose of this mode of
reconciliation is clearly the re-integration of participants in the Australian nation-state through
the national ritual of apology and forgiveness, and by learning and acknowledging ‘our shared
histories’. In other words, the purpose of ‘reconciliation’ initiated by the Council for Abori-
ginal Reconciliation is re-imagining the united nation-state of Australia. I would like to
call such a style of reconciliation ‘closed reconciliation’. By the word ‘closed’ I want to empha-
sise that Indigenous issues are recognised as ‘domestic problems’ to be solved within the
framework of the nation-state, and thus the global implications of Australian colonialism are
not considered. Nonetheless, Indigenous peoples’ rights are an international concern. For
example, since 1982 the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP)
has promoted global networks among indigenous peoples from different countries. Even
though there is a sense of international alliance among different countries’ indigenous
populations, their political activism has mainly targeted improvement in their social stand-
ing and rights within the nation-state where each indigenous group has been colonised. There-
fore, Aboriginal people’s rights and reconciliation have been sought within the framework
of the ‘Australian problem’. Even though there is international concern about ‘indigenous
rights’ or ‘reconciliation’, each ‘right’ and ‘reconciliation’ has been recognised as a domes-
tic issue of each nation-state.
It is reasonable to say, as Benedict Anderson argues, that notions of ‘minority’, ‘ethnicity’
and ‘indigeneity’ are the product of colonial modernity and of a particular nation-state.9
Because of this, I do not want to underestimate the importance of promoting indigenous
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This begs the question of whether borderlines between Australian and British identity can
be drawn so easily, and how British ‘being’ is actively marked and negotiated.
Understanding Britfest as a folklife festival provides a useful way to think through these
issues. Richard Bauman and Patricia Sawin have argued that folklife festivals are forms
of cultural production in which ‘symbolically resonant cultural goods and values are placed
on public display’, often as a counterpoise to mass, elite or official culture and to preserve
and promote histories seen as valuable and necessary. And yet as Bauman and Sawin also
note, folklore and folkways are largely the invention of the late eighteenth century, and
have always been about the politics of culture. They point out that at folklife festivals in
particular certain aspects of cultural life are valued over others in the service of larger
political agendas.33
One need only consider the symbols that dominate Britfest—the Union Jack, the dis-
tinctive British police, the military and the early medieval, the Royal rather than the Royle
family—to understand what kind of Britishness and what vision of Britain is being celebrated
at this event. It is not a pluralistic vision of a varied and changing group of peoples with a
broad range of social, cultural, racial and linguistic affiliations, but imagined characteristics
of shared origin, language, religion and race—a singular social identity and often inherently
conservative (a)political community. Apart from the romantic idealisation of the morris dancer
and the pearly king and queen, there are certainly no working-class values or symbols
evoked—no mention of British unionism, the solidarity of miners or indeed of the Tolpuddle
Martyrs, who arrived in the penal colony of NSW as very early, albeit unwilling, migrants.
There is no acknowledgement of the industrial north or Midlands, of terrace living, Coro-
nation Street, or city life in general. And there are certainly no references to the products of
post–Second World War West Indian and Asian migrants to Britain: no curry sauce to go
with the fish and chips, and nobody to replicate the cross-cultural mimicry of ‘Ali G’. For
the organisers of the UKSA, while ‘there ain’t no black in the Union Jack’, there isn’t even
‘Britpop’ or ‘Cool Britannia’.34
In this respect, it is helpful to think, with Ien Ang, about Britfest as a form of ‘auto-
biographical’ display deliberately and rhetorically constructed for public purposes, ‘a
strategically fabricated performance, one which stages … an identity which can be put to
work’. To paraphrase Ang, it is the usefulness of that identity—what it is being put forward
for—which determines the politics of such autobiographical discourse. As we have argued,
Britfest cannot be understood as a spontaneous ‘organic’ emergence from the British com-
munity at Frankston, or within Australia as whole, but as the work of the predominantly
middle-class heritage advocacy group within the UKSA—where this group within the UKSA
is at has informed and articulated the meaning of where they’re from.35
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rights within nation-states. In Australia this would include the promotion of Aboriginal self-
determination, land rights, rights under Native title and ‘National Reconciliation’.
These are important domestic issues which I hope the Australian government and people
sincerely promote as part of the national agenda. However, I could not help asking myself
this question: am I, a Japanese citizen living in Australia for over six years, not responsible
at all for Aboriginal reconciliation? In more general terms, the question is whether indigenous
issues related to ‘reconciliation’ should be treated only as a ‘closed’ process of re-integration
of the nation. Are indigenous issues nothing but a ‘national problem’?
In a previous article, ‘Anti-Minorities History’, I explored the possibilities of globalising
Aboriginal historiography by ‘unfocusing’ the Australian national history and connecting
Aboriginal pasts with the histories of Asian migrants to Australia.10 Using ‘Aboriginal recon-
ciliation’ and ‘fabrication of the national memory’ as key concepts, I here want to explore
ways of globalising indigenous issues by emancipating them from the notion of a ‘national
agenda’. For this purpose, what needed is the opposite direction of ‘closed reconciliation’:
I seek for, namely, ‘open reconciliation’, in which the global responsibilities and implications
of Australian colonisation become the primary agenda for an alternative process of Abori-
ginal reconciliation.
Asian migrants and aboriginal reconciliation
The components of reconciliation include an apology, social justice in the present, and
acknowledgement of the past injustice. Let us start with how to acknowledge past injustice.
As we have already seen, in the Australian Declaration, ‘the peoples of Australia, of many
origins’ are expected to ‘learn our shared histories’. What kind of ‘shared histories’ are
Australians expected to learn? The Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation has already shown
their view of ‘our shared histories’ in the 1993 document Sharing History: A Sense for All Aus-
tralians of a Shared Ownership of Their History.11 Reading this, it becomes fairly clear what
kind of memories of the past we are expected to share: histories of the invasion of Australian
by the British colonialists; histories of several Aboriginal attempts to reconcile with ‘whites’
in the early stages of colonisation; histories of mainstream Australian society refusing to
acknowledge the human rights of Aborigines; or histories of cultural oppression by
missionaries and governments moved by the logic of assimilation. After describing these
pasts, Sharing History concludes by saying ‘Reconciliation is about addressing past grievances
and about forging a new foundation for future relations between Indigenous and non-
Indigenous Australians’.12 However, there is no statement on Australian non-white migrants’
responsibility for Aboriginal reconciliation.
Given the fact that ‘we, the peoples of Australia, of many origins as we are,’ are expected
to ‘share histories’ of the British invasion of Australia, and that it is also expected that ‘one
—
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and usually attracts somewhere between 10,000 and 15,000 people. Frankston’s Britfest has
been less successful. Dogged alternately by rain and hot weather, there have been difficulties
in attracting the necessary crowds to make the festival financially viable. The 2001 Britfest
attracted less than 2000 people, numbers so low that the Frankston Football Club refused
to run a bar at the oval. When all costs had been accounted for, the UKSA barely made a
profit from the event, dashing any hopes of it being an important fundraiser for the association.
If a festival of Britishness has not proved to be a drawcard for spectators, the organisers
have also reported serious problems in recruiting participants willing to put their ethnicity
on display. The UKSA president commented during an interview that ‘the Scots are very
good; there’s an enormous range of Scottish things going on … But there’s Scottish things
going on all over the place’. By inference he indicated that Britfest had hoped to cater for ‘the
Irish [who only] have St Patrick’s Day and that’s about it [and] the Welsh [who] have a church
service for St David’s Day’. Most of all, it appears that a major aim of Britfest was to pro-
vide an outlet for the re-creation of English ethnicity, and perhaps to compensate for the
small turnout at St George’s Day functions. This reflects, of course, wider historical confla-
tion of English and British identities, but also more recent (and perhaps anxious) recon-
structions and re-affiliations.31
Given the relative failure of Frankston’s Britfest, the UKSA has decided to promote British-
ness, and the association itself, through stalls at other events and by instigating a new range
of social activities. It intends to make more use of its clubrooms at the English Speaking
Union, closer to the centre of Melbourne, and to develop its role as an umbrella organisation
with affiliated groups around the state and country. The UKSA already has some affiliates
within the South Australian group TEA (The English in Australia), which set itself up rapidly
but quickly dwindled to only sixty members. It has also approached the Merseyside Associ-
ation of Victoria and the WISE (Welsh, Irish, Scottish, English) People, who are centred in
the nearby suburb of Dandenong. Both of these groups, however, prefer to maintain their
independence and not unite as part of a wider mobilising force to act out Britishness
in Australia.
Performing transnational identity?
As Richard White has commented:
It is not usual for people to act out their nationality. Only in particular circumstances is
nationality self-consciously and actively imagined, usually circumstances where the
borderlines between ‘us and them’ can be not only marked but negotiated and brought
into being.32
—
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part of the nation apologises and expresses its sorrow and sincere regret for the injustices of
the past’, the logical conclusion is that non-British migrants, such as Asian migrants in Aus-
tralia, are responsible for the history of British colonisation of Australia and, thus, have to
apologise to the indigenous people of Australia for ‘the injustice of the past’ done by the
British. However, I would argue that the issue is not so much how Asian migrants accept and
share (with whites) the past injustice done by the British. Rather, what needs to be explored
is how to identify the specific histories of non-Anglo migrants’ past (injustice) that need to
be shared (with Indigenous Australians). In other words, even though non-Anglo migrants
are not responsible for the British invasion of Australia, they may still be responsible for their
own injustice in the past, their own colonisation of Australia.
Before I explore this point further, I want to suggest three ‘historical subjects’ of Australian
history—mainstream Anglo-Celtic (whites/Europeans), Asian migrants and Indigenous Aus-
tralians in order to make my argument simpler. However, I will also address the serious prob-
lems that are inevitable when categorising the ‘historical subject’.
What needs to be questioned here are modes of accessing ‘collective memory’. Many people
would probably agree that the colonisation of Australia was lead by Anglo-Celts, and they
were not only colonialists but also racists. Therefore, it is reasonable to argue that both Asian
migrants and Aboriginal people were the victims of the white domination of Australia. If so,
on what grounds do Asian Australians have to share the ‘injustice of the past’ in an equal
manner with whites and apologise to Indigenous Australians? Since Sharing History does not
particularly mention the Asian commitment to the Australian invasion and colonisation, it
is logical to assume that they (under the category of ‘non-Indigenous’) are expected to access
the ‘memory of black–white pasts of injustice’. In other words, every non-Indigenous Aus-
tralian is meant to be equally responsible for the British colonisation of Australia. Here is the
problem related to the ‘fabrication of national memory’. Ghassan Hage, who himself is a post-
war Lebanese migrant, summarised the issue I raise here as follows:
Is there a difference between the migrant saying that ‘these events do not concern me’ and
the established Australian citizen saying the same thing on different grounds? Can a migrant
relate affectively to a past that is not his or her own? Can a migrant ever genuinely care for
the nation without such an identification with the past? Can he or she ever experience an
intense sense of participatory belonging the way people who are assumed to identify more
fully with the past experience it?13
Hage argues Australian (non-white) migrants are ‘in a contradictory colonial location’
because migration is clearly a continuing colonial process, but, at the same time, share ‘import-
ant realities’ with Indigenous people in being excluded by white Australians’ racist policy.14
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cheap phone cards, ballroom-dancing lessons and immigration consultants. ‘British interests’
are defined broadly and include Scottish, Welsh and to some extent Irish as well as English
interests. UKSA membership tends to reflect the breakdown of the English (80 per cent),
Scottish (13 per cent), Welsh (3 per cent) and Northern Ireland (3 per cent) migrants
in Australia.
As those responsible for Endeavour admit, the tone of the publication is highly defensive.
In the past few years, issues have included articles with titles such as ‘British Australians now
officially second-class citizens’, ‘Anglophobia costs Australia $millions’ and ‘Threats to Brits’.28
In the June–July 2002 issue, the defensive stance had become an offensive front, with opinion
columns calling for volunteers to form ‘a UKSA sub-committee to address the issue of racial
vilification directed against our community’, and an article supporting findings of the Qualifi-
cations and Curriculum Authority in Britain that ‘UK educationists want to teach pride in
white English culture’. Most of these articles are reproduced on the UKSA’s website (which
features a Union Jack–clad Geri Halliwell). Endeavour also provides the opportunity for
members to purchase stickers and T-shirts reading ‘Proud to be Anglo-Saxon’ and ‘Proud
to be Celtic’.
The UKSA makes broad claims to represent British migrants and their descendants, to
make representations to Parliament and government departments in the name of British
migrants, and to represent the interests of the British community against media prejudice
and discrimination. One segment of the UKSA certainly sees its role as a defender of British-
ness and British heritage,29 and the association has received small grants from both the federal
and state governments for specific projects aligned to their constituency. But this does not
necessarily mean that the UKSA has, in the past decade, rebuilt itself along ‘ethnic’ lines, and
that advocacy has become its primary function.30
According to the president, ‘the backbone of the Association’ is really the social activities,
mostly the dances, held by the six regional branches: Camberwell, Eastern Districts, Glen
Waverley, Preston, Springvale and Frankston. Moreover, interviews with UKSA branch mem-
bers suggest many are more interested in the organisation as a forum for social activity—for
dancing, darts nights, coach trips to play poker machines and meals at pubs—than in pro-
moting a more prominent role for, or rarefied sense of, British culture and heritage. Indeed
there is evident tension between those who see it needing to become a more viable vehicle
for the advocacy of all things British and those who prefer to concentrate on the weekly social
activities, born of the shared experience of migrancy and forms of sociability and entertain-
ment based on working-class lifestyle and values.
Although both groups are present at Britfest, it appears to be the advocacy group who has
done most to push for the event. The Frankston Britfest organisers took the idea from a simi-
larly named event in the Sydney working-class suburb of Blacktown, which began in 1996
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Hage has no doubt that Asian Australians should support Aboriginal sovereignty but he also
summarises this complicated situation by saying ‘No neat relation to Australian history here,
and too many vacillating conatus … a very postcolonial colonial situation’.15 Now let’s listen
to his ‘subjective’ and creative narrative:
I ought to thank the Aboriginal people for letting me in … Except they didn’t give me a visa either
… I ought to apologise … to each her therapy … I might be onto another ‘good thing’ here: the
struggle for the equal right to apologise and recognise injustice! That must go far … Actually, maybe
I can belong here. That guy Noel Pearson said that Australia is made out of indigenous and non-
indigenous people. I like that. Finally a category that puts me and John Howard in the same posi-
tion. Maybe I can belong here … Who says I don’t care …16
By sharing the ‘injustice of the past’ with mainstream Anglo-Celtic Australian society, Hage
cynically suggests Asian migrants can finally acquire racial equality.
To my knowledge, there are surprisingly few articles discussing Asian commitment to
Aboriginal reconciliation. Peter Read is one of the few scholars who explicitly warns that the
Reconciliation Council has been too preoccupied with the black–white binary. Read sug-
gests the need for opening up ways of inviting ‘The Third Side of the Triangle’, Australians
who are of neither British nor Aboriginal descent.17 Dipesh Chakrabarty discusses a similar
point in a more theoretical manner.18 Chakrabarty argues that Henry Reynolds’s (one of
the co-authors of Sharing History) model of reconciliation is confined to blacks and whites,
based on a ‘conquest-paradigm’ in which there is no space for immigrants to participate. On
the other hand, Chakrabarty argues, Mudrooroo speaks of Aboriginal history from a
‘colonisation-paradigm’ in which ‘Aboriginal knowledges, life-worlds and life-practices were
not only invaded but they were colonised as well’.19 There, Chakrabarty sees the possible
conversation between Aboriginal people and immigrants today: ‘It is not based necessarily
on “shared histories” (as may be claimed between the settler and native) but on the shared
predicament of having been colonised (both politically and intellectually)’.20 Therefore,
Chakrabarty tries to promote Asian participation in Aboriginal reconciliation by sharing in
the ‘predicament’ with Aboriginal people, rather than (as Hage argues) by sharing in the
‘injustice of the past’ with white Australians.
I want to place this debate in the wider context of Australian historiography. Since the late
1990s, two relatively independently developed historiographies of Australia—Aboriginal
history and Asian Australian history—have begun to communicate with each other.21 In the
context of current Australian politics, Aboriginal human/land rights and multiculturalism
began to be discussed in a more connected manner than ever before. Ann Curthoys points
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the one hand, many are happy to maintain the comfort of being ‘invisible migrants’ for the
privileges of settler status and the perceived lack of necessity to recall the consequences of
‘settlement’, including the troubling history of the conquest of Indigenous Australians and
a long ‘tradition’ of racism.24 On the other hand, while their British culture and identity may
be invisible to certain cultural arbiters, less visible forms and signs of identification do exist
and to some extent prevail. Some have argued that ‘lurking behind’ the insistence of British
migrants ‘that their side of the story should be told, [and] that the history of British migrants
had been forgotten’ is a ‘palpable’ sense of a need ‘to express their version of a distinct “British”
… ethnic identity, apparently overwhelmed by the multicultural emphasis on non-British
ethnicities’.25 However, our observations in the Frankston area suggest that the self-
construction of individual and collective British identities is as multiple as it is contradictory:
any notion of self-ethnicisation needs to be seen as fluid, evolving in response to the speci-
ficities of temporal, spatial and political ‘moments’ and circumstances.26
Organising british identity
British migrants have met in the Frankston area throughout the postwar period, forming
credit cooperatives, soccer clubs and social groups either independently or as a focal point
within other, often church-based, organisations. As early as 1953, the Immigration Depart-
ment’s Good Neighbour bulletin was reporting on the activities of a reinvigorated Hearts
of Oak Club holding fortnightly dances in a local hall.27 Britfest, however, is an activity organ-
ised by the UKSA, which was formed in 1967 by migrants living in the Frankston area.
Although these ties with Frankston remain important (the current president resides in the
nearby suburb of Mt Eliza), the UKSA now has six branches within the Melbourne metro-
politan area. Originally established as a support network for new arrivals, it has under-
gone several changes over the years, at one time comprising a travel agency that provided
discount airfares, with offices on Brunswick Street, Fitzroy, in inner Melbourne.
In its current manifestation, the UKSA claims to be ‘the only national organization rep-
resenting migrants from all parts of the British Isles’ and to act in the interests of British
migrants and their descendants who are ‘proud to be British Australians’. Members receive
a copy of the bi-monthly journal Endeavour, discounts on various goods, access to a library
of folk music from Britain and the opportunity to participate in the branch-organised social
events. While these social functions are central to the UKSA’s present operations, over the
past decade the organisation has assumed a more active role in the promotion of ‘British cul-
ture and heritage’. The major vehicle for this has been Endeavour, which contains reports of
the association’s events, letters from readers on items of ‘British interest’, articles on British
history and culture, recipes for ‘British Regional Cuisine’, and advertisements for venues
such as the Charles Dickens Tavern, the Pint and Pickle, and for services to readers, including
—
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out that the high degree of public support for the One Nation Party, which attacked both
Aboriginal people and immigrants, ‘forced another kind of rethinking of some of
these issues’.22
Curthoys has been consciously studying the issues of connection between Aboriginal and
Asian histories in Australia since as early as the 1970s. She explored this question in her PhD
thesis in 1973,23 and recently brought the issue to the fore again in several articles.24 Curthoys
points out that, since multicultural discourses became dominant in the 1980s, Aboriginal
and Asian migrant experiences under white Australian racism have been discussed analogi-
cally. In other words, multiculturalism has tended to locate Indigenous issues within the
frame of cultural diversity in Australia. Aboriginal people have consistently objected to
this paradigm; stressing their uniqueness, they have refused to be seen as just one of the
‘ethnic minorities’ of Australia.25 Therefore, instead of locating Indigenous issues in the con-
text of cultural diversity, Curthoys suggests locating the issues of cultural diversity in the
context of Indigenous issues.26 At first glance, her claim sounds similar to Chakrabarty’s call
to share in the ‘predicament’ of Indigenous Australians. But what Curthoys wants to empha-
sise is the fact that Asian migrants are also colonisers. Her claim is also different from the
position taken up by Hage. Instead of putting Asian migrants ‘and John Howard in the same
position’, she argues that in contemporary Australia, colonisation and de-colonisation are
happening at the same time:
The continuing presence of colonialism has implications for all immigrants, whether first-
generation or sixth. All non-indigenous people, recent immigrants and descendants of immi-
grants alike, are beneficiaries of a colonial history. We share the situation of living on someone
else’s land.27
Curthoys emphasises that the British invasion of Aboriginal nations is ‘the big picture’. At
the same time, she calls for studies of the complex cultural interactions of Australia not with-
in the framework of cultural diversity but as part of the continuing colonial process.28
I have examined several different arguments concerned with Asian migrants’ positionality
in relation to Aboriginal reconciliation and the wider context of ‘connecting’ Indigenous and
Asian histories in Australia. Once one meditates on the issues of Aboriginal reconciliation
from the complex positionality of Asian migrants (who were the victims of Australian racism
as well as colonisers of Indigenous nations), it seems to me unrealistic and undesirable to aim
for ‘a united Australia’ through the process of reconciliation. Instead, I think it is more impor-
tant to realise a ‘disunited Australia’, in which different positions require different memo-
ries, responsibilities and ‘implications’ in order to commit to Aboriginal reconciliation. These
relatively new arguments on Asian migrants and Aboriginal reconciliation are still only
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Because Britishness was culturally embedded within Australian identity, it was available as
a point of identification both in terms of formal citizenship and in other specific instances
and locations—from the romance of a Royal Tour to the closed rank of shop steward or
domestic and culinary Englishness. But the class-based nature of cultural Englishness that
found expression in the modulated accents acceptable for radio broadcasting on the ABC,
or among the professions and ‘high’ society, did not produce a sense of belonging among the
mainly working- and lower-middle-class Britons who migrated to Australia. Drawing on
Hage, we would argue that contrary to popular conceptions that the British have constituted
a ‘natural aristocracy’, most British migrants have not experienced governmental forms of
belonging and some have not experienced even ‘homely’ forms of it. As Hage has argued,
‘one needed to accumulate something more specific within Britishness to acquire … govern-
mental power’, and that something was ‘class’.19
One ground for suspicion of much discussion of shared ethnic identity is that it ‘pre-
supposes conceptions of collective identity that are remarkably unsubtle in their under-
standings of the processes by which identities, both individual and collective, develop’.20 In
the Australian context, themes of mobility—of opportunity, getting on or going nowhere21—
establish a crucial link between the construction of identity and the circumstances in which
lives and identities are made. While Britfest is problematic because of the ways in which it
is not a representation of migration history or culture among British migrants in Frankston,
the interactions and performance of class identities at this ‘ethnic festival’ are striking.
The centrality of class to British identities in Australia makes us pause before agreeing
with Jon Stratton that ‘rather than being imposed on them [as in the case of other migrant
groups in Australia], British migrants and their descendants are engaged in a process of self-
ethnicisation’. Efforts by the Hawke and Keating governments of the 1980s and 1990s to
remove privileges enjoyed by British migrants led to a feeling among these people that ‘they
have lost a status, and an entitlement, to what was naturally theirs’. Stratton argues that
changes in formal ties between Britain and Australia in the 1980s had the effect of ‘decreasing
the rights of British migrants and of making them feel that they no longer have political lever-
age in Australia’, and that this led ‘to a self-ethnicisation of the British in Australia in order
to claim a new visibility and a new power’.22
While in some quarters spurious notions of racial identity have crept back into public dis-
course under the guise of a recovered ethnicity,23 Stratton’s assertions are too totalising. Such
a stance may reflect the position of some British migrants, but, on the basis of extensive com-
munity interviews and observations of Britfest over three years, we would argue that many,
possibly even a majority, of British migrants are no more interested in self-ethnicisation than
they are in increasing their visibility or in producing ‘an increasing sense of ethnic
self-consciousness’ among themselves as a community. The reasons for this are twofold. On
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‘half-opened’. Compared to the Australian Declaration, which naively aims to achieve ‘a united
Australia’ through the national ritual of apologies and forgiveness, the arguments outlined
above certainly alert us to different political and historical positions, which, I believe, require
critical thinking to take Aboriginal reconciliation beyond the framework of it being a ‘domes-
tic problem’.
Ann Curthoys and John Docker recently edited a special section, ‘Genocide?: Australian
Aboriginal History in International Perspective’, in the journal Aboriginal History. In their
introductory article, Curthoys and Docker suggest the importance of looking at Aboriginal
historiography in an international perspective without ‘false analogy’.29 In a broader sense,
this article can be identified as one of those international approaches to Aboriginal
historiography that is seeking ways of de-nationalising indigenous issues and creating a space
for ‘open reconciliation’ to bring the global implications of the colonial past (and present)
to light.
Indigenous australians and japanese labour migrants
Reading the literature on Japanese migration and the pearl-shell industry, it is rare to find
studies that explore Aboriginal–Japanese relationships. In what is perhaps the first study
of Japanese labour migrants, David Sissons does not mention such relationships at all in his
1979 article. Although Mary A. Bain mentions stories about the ‘lubra trade’ or ‘warlike Abori-
gines’, working relations or the nature of the colonial experiences are not the themes of
her book Full Fathom Five.30 The emphasis of Japanese historians is usually on the inter-
nationally acclaimed excellence of the Japanese divers and their endurance of Australian
racism. For example, Shuuji Kyuhara writes:
[In Australia] Japanese fishery people went through numerous difficulties, fought them out,
and with their bravery and efforts, risking their lives, they improved diving technology and
found new fishing grounds. With original and exquisite Japanese skills, without peer among
peoples of other nations, they have developed the pearl industry.31
Another historian, Taira Ogawa, takes a similar view in his Arafura Kai no Shinju (Pearls in
the Arafura Sea), but, in addition, he introduces the perspectives of former Japanese divers
on Indigenous Australians in a small section called ‘primitive race bushman’. Both Ogawa’s
narrative and the oral histories of Japanese ex–pearl divers present nothing other than racist
discourses.32 For example, Ogawa introduces stories of Japanese divers being attacked and
eaten by ‘bushmen’, and reports that Japanese ex-divers also told him that Aboriginal women
had ‘the rut’.33 According to Ogawa, ‘settled bushmen’ who worked for the pearl or trepang
industry were employed because they did not demand money and were satisfied with clothes
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Welsh and Irish origin, and more broadly diasporic British peoples across the empire—
had a particular currency in Australia.
There are, of course, significant problems with the idea of Britishness, Englishness, Anglo-
Celticness or Anglo-Saxonness, even within Britain itself. It has been claimed that an
Anglo-Saxon racial lineage lies at the base or ‘taproot’ of an Englishness often collapsed into
Britishness—an idea of Anglo-Saxonness reinvented and romanticised by the English them-
selves in the nineteenth century as a myth of commonality and subsequently transported to
Australia.12 Unsurprisingly, imperial and colonial Britishness has proved similarly elusive.
Just as sociologists and historians have been unpicking British and English identities
in Britain and the post-imperial world over the last two decades, this unravelling extends to
Australia.13
The formulation that a singular and coherent Britishness has made more sense in Australia
than in Britain is at first glance persuasive. As James Jupp has argued, while there were signifi-
cant cultural and economic differences between the distinctive nations and regions of Britain,
the colonial environment was highly assimilatory because of the scattered nature of settle-
ment, the decline of non–English speaking migrants, the use of English in the education
system and the Anglicisation of Britain itself.14 In Australia, the argument goes, peoples from
England, Scotland, Wales and even Ireland had much more in common than they did in
Britain. Britishness in Australia was not the same as Britishness in Britain—it was a unique
form of Britishness that underscored an emergent Australian nationalism.15
The development and consolidation of Australian national identity is crucial to under-
standing how a ‘transplanted’ Britishness was, and is, constructed. The sentimental attach-
ments to ‘home’ and ‘kith and kin’ by postwar leaders and immigration planners meant that
the ‘Australian way of life’ was grafted onto notions of British heritage, community and ‘stan-
dards’, and a sense of the ‘indissoluble unity of the British people everywhere’.16 From 1948
to 1987 the Nationality and Citizenship Act protected and reinforced the British character of
Australian society, and deemed ‘alien’ those who were not a British subject, an Irish citizen
or a ‘protected person’. The idea of Anglo-Saxon kinship, of ethnic commonality, has con-
tinued to be remarkably persistent within Australian culture. It is still possible to hear the
echo of prime minister Robert Menzies, who, arguing for a redistribution of ‘Empire popu-
lation’, believed we should ‘no more question the movement of people from England to Aus-
tralia than we would question a movement of people from Yorkshire to Somerset or Melbourne
to Perth’.17
For migrants themselves, their movement was never a matter of simple ‘transplantation’
to a British settlement overseas.18 Migrant Britons who arrived after the Second World War
often felt distant from established ‘Anglo-Celtic’ Australia, but were assumed to feel ‘at home’.
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and tobacco. At one point he suggests that the ability of Aborigines to hunt fish, birds and
kangaroo was very useful in the industry, and adds: ‘their sense of smell and sight demon-
strate extraordinary superhuman-like talent, which is almost akin to animals’.34
What becomes clear in these narratives is the existence of a kind of ‘dual racism’ in the
pearling towns where Japanese migrants were themselves victims of white racism and per-
petrators of racism directed towards Indigenous Australians. Such a hierarchical racial social
stratum seems typical of rural Australian towns and is well described by both Bain and Fujio
Nakan, the latter in his account of a Japanese diver and his Aboriginal wife.35 In a peculiar
way this narrative—of Japanese migrants who suffered in a foreign country but who, against
the odds, developed a new industry—is in fact quite similar to that of many white Australian
historical narratives before the 1960s. The difference is that those who suffered and sacrificed
for the future were not white Australians but Japanese migrants.
The literature examined so far does not consider the Indigenous side of Aboriginal–Japanese
relations in the history of the pearl-shell industry, and it’s to this issue that I will now turn.
Athol Chase’s anthropological research discusses Aboriginal–Asian working relations in Cape
York.36 According to Chase, Aboriginal people welcomed the Asian ‘visitors’ because they
did not try to dispossess their lands as Europeans did:
The Japanese, ‘Manillamen’, Malays and others who came from the sea to set up tem-
porary coastal camps and shore stations were more interested in establishing peaceful
relations with local communities in order to obtain cheap labour and access to women.37
He also compares Japanese attitudes towards Aboriginal people with those of Europeans:
Most importantly, the Japanese were not ‘flash’ (that is, proud or pretentious): they ate
and slept with Aborigines and respected Aboriginal knowledge of coasts, weather and bush-
foods. Europeans, on the other hand, had a reputation for breaking agreements and cheating
Aborigines out of rightfully-earned pay. Moreover, they could be ‘cheeky’, or dangerous
when annoyed.38
In short, Chase’s emphasis is on the close and friendly relationship between Aboriginal
and Japanese labourers under the oppressive colonial regime.
Regina Ganter’s historical research has resulted in intensive studies on race-relations in
the pearl-shell industry of northern Australia. In The Pearl-Shellers of Torres Strait, Ganter’s
tale is similar to Chase’s and focuses on the close and friendly relationships between Abori-
gines and Japanese. However, while Chase came to this conclusion based on his interviews
with Aboriginal people of the region, Ganter’s sources are principally Japanese ex–pearl
divers.39 Despite relying on very similar sources to Ogawa, Ganter’s version sharply con-
tradicts Ogawa’s racist narrative.40
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In the historiography of Aboriginal–Japanese relations in northern Australia, historians
have not yet paid much attention to the simple fact that Asian migrants were both victims
of white colonial racism and deeply involved in the colonisation of the Aboriginal lands. I
have no intention of suggesting that the involvement of Asian migrants in the processes of
colonisation was the same as that of the British. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume, as Chase
and Ganter indicate, that Indigenous Australians saw Asian migrants as less oppressive
and more friendly than the white colonial authorities who dominated the industry. Therefore,
I want to repeat—here there was not a single racism at work but a hierarchy of racisms.
Nevertheless, what has not yet been explored is the history of Asian migrants as colonial agents.
A detailed study of this proposition is beyond the scope of this article but I want to briefly
look at two issues that would be central to any such account: Japanese exploitation of
Aboriginal land and sea resources, and Japanese exploitation of Aboriginal women.
Japanese exploitation of aboriginal lands and seas
According to Kyuhara, Japanese workers as a group earned a total of £25,860 a year on Thurs-
day Island in 1894. If you add the value of their property (their houses and ships), it is over
£50,000.41 Kyuhara writes, ‘With courage and patience of not being afraid of any circum-
stances, by overcoming many difficulties, they made an enormous fortune’.42 Such narra-
tives that emphasise the success of Japanese migrants in Australia may be welcomed by con-
temporary historiography as a contribution to the multicultural dimensions of the Australian
past. But, this type of narrative lacks the historical imagination necessary to regard such
‘enormous fortunes’ as having been built by exploiting Indigenous people’s land and sea.
While earlier studies often emphasise the ways in which mainstream white-racist Australian
authorities and entrepreneurs used cheap labour to compete with and resist the Japanese
involvement in the industry, few studies have tried to point out that such ‘competition’
between whites and Japanese was carried out without the consent of the original owners of
these natural resources.43
Indigenous sea rights have been discussed as a ‘logical extension of land rights’.44 Although
Indigenous ‘rights’ over the waters emerged relatively recently in legal debate, there is a long
history of Indigenous Australians claiming coastal waters as part of their country. Bain quotes
from Tataro Maeda, an ex–pearl diver in the early 1950s:
From the beginning there was trouble with natives of nearby islands when we worked in
shallow seas, as they had the right to fish there. The Japanese had then to go out to much
deeper sea.45
It is reasonable to assume such understandings were common among the settlers, or at least
among Japanese pearl-shell workers. It unlikely that Japanese and Indigenous people of the
—
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Frankston functions as a regional retail, service and commercial hub, largely as a result of
extensive residential development since the Second World War.5 With its scenic beaches and
cheap land, Frankston became the place where postwar British migrants’ dreams of seaside
suburbia could become a reality, providing the ideal locale in which to seek ‘comfort and
security in a warm climate’.6 By the mid-1960s, almost 20 per cent of those living in the
Frankston area were British-born;7 and while this number has slowly diminished due to
an ageing population, in 1996 still 12 per cent of all Frankston residents were born in Britain
or Ireland (compared to an average of approximately 6 per cent of British-born living else-
where in Melbourne). And yet, despite this relatively high concentration of British-born,
Frankston is not recognised as an ‘ethnic suburb’ and has no public profile as a ‘little Britain’
or ‘little England’. In this particular case, the invisibility of British migrants as a distinct group
is coupled with the fact that they live in an ‘ordinary’, and now some-what economically
depressed, working and lower-middle-class suburb on the fringe of greater Melbourne.
The migrants drawn to Frankston were, of course, part of the huge postwar drive to attract
Britons to Australia. Between 1947 and 1991 a total of more than one and a half million
migrants arrived from Britain, many as assisted ‘ten pound tourists’ or under other related
sponsorship schemes.8 It has been widely accepted that Britons were willing migrants,
welcomed and easily assimilated into Australian society. In part this is why assertions about
the place and identity of British migrants—lumped with the Anglo-Australian mainstream—
have been too easily made or gone unchallenged. There has been little recognition that for
Britons, also, migration has resulted in complex changes in relationships with the ‘home-
land’, and thus in the migrant’s transformed sense of self and community in Australia.9 Aus-
tralian postwar immigration policies clearly favoured migrants from Britain, and the arrival
of British migrants in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s inspired little of the curiosity and alarm
that was sparked by the arrival of significant numbers of migrants from northern, central
and southern Europe, and, a little later, from the Middle East and South-East Asia. In this
regard, Mark Peel has argued that British migrants are among ‘the poorest served of all groups
in the history of Australian migration, with accounts ranging from anecdotal whimsy to an
almost hostile dismissal of migrant Britons as the pampered beneficiaries of Australia’s cul-
tural cringe’.10
By developing new non-totalising conceptions of British migrants to Australia—and
especially the English within this group—it is possible to re-evaluate how forms of British-
ness have constituted a ‘dominant cultural myth in Australia’ that has been ‘more pervasive
in Australia than in Britain itself’.11 Understanding the way this still resonates today involves
recognising that Britishness is historically based, and that during the nineteenth and much
of the twentieth centuries, the idea of a ‘British people’—combining those of English, Scots,
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area shared the same concept of ‘(sea) rights’ at that time. However, when Bain and Ogawa
write of ‘bushmen’ or ‘warlike Aborigines’ attacking Japanese workers, the story of friendly
relations has clearly become a situation in which Indigenous people were resisting the settler
invasion of their country and/or the abrogation of their rights.
Japanese exploitation of aboriginal women
I also want to discuss the very sensitive matter of sexual relationships between Indigenous
women and settler men. Sexual relations between Aboriginal women and Asian migrants in
northern Australia were seen by colonial authorities as a serious problem. Missions and
government administrators repeatedly reported on Aboriginal women’s ‘immoral traffic with
the lugger crews’, and while these activities were legally banned, they were not well con-
trolled. According to these reports, Aboriginal elders sent young women to the lugger
ships for a night and received flour, tobacco, sugar or grog in return.46
It would be simplistic to claim Japanese ‘exploitation’ of Aboriginal women from these
accounts. This is an extremely complex matter involving gender, cultural diversity and
colonialism. Sarah Yu argues that such exchanges of goods and women were well accepted
among Aboriginal societies on the Kimberley coast as long as the ‘payment’ was agreeable.
Yu quotes from Edna Hopiga, an Aboriginal woman whose grandfather was a Malay man:
That’s a good idea for people. Help one another. Blackfella never worry about it. There used
to be whiskey too if they want’em. But mainly tucker.
That’s not the blackfella or Malay fault. They did it for themselves. Wasn’t wrong.47
Yu points out that it was a European perception that such activities were ‘scandalous’ or
‘intolerable’. She argues instead that ‘the presence of the luggers with their Asian crews
provided another opportunity for the Karajarri living in the bush to secure necessary rations
without having to associate with the white authorities’.48 Here again, the framework Yu applies
is ‘friendly relations between Aboriginal and Asian migrants under oppressive white
authorities’, in other words, Indigenous issues in the context of cultural diversity.
There has been a similar debate over settler–Aboriginal sexual relationships in the pastoral
industry of Australia. For example, Ann McGrath disagrees with the stereotyped notion that
‘Aboriginal women were exploited by brutal white stockmen’ and claims Aboriginal women
enjoyed receiving ‘gifts’ from white men in these exchanges.49 In contrast, Deborah
B. Rose warns us of the existence of undocumented sexual abuse and not to underestimate
the traumatic experiences of Aboriginal women.50 In this article, I just want to say we need
an extremely careful approach to understand these issues. I agree with Yu that one should
not accuse anyone without inquiring into the cultural, social and economic backgrounds of
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British identity may seem, in this context, the least problematic or contested of categories—
and one which, on the surface, is more closely aligned with the national ‘mainstream’ than
with ethnic ‘others’. But recent attempts to find a public space for Britishness, and analyses
of such moves, offer insights into the broader tensions that surround the meanings of migrant
identity. Most revealing is that such re-creations of Britishness prove problematic, or at least
unsettling, for many postwar British migrants. The Frankston Britfest, and by extension the
activities of its organising body—the United Kingdom Settlers’ Association (UKSA)—are not
so much an example of British ‘self-ethnicising’ in an attempt to establish ‘a new visibility
and new power’ in Australia.3 Rather, they can be seen as the attempted remobilisation by
an uneasy but socially empowered group of a heightened public presence for their concep-
tion of history, culture and nationhood. This newly emphasised public presence involves a
negotiation, or indeed non-negotiation, of that presence by a majority of British migrants
who, for a number of reasons, are much more ambivalent about the need for such forms of
ethnic self-display. While it is self-consciously styled as a vernacular expression of trans-
national identification, Frankston’s Britfest originates from and is contoured by the concerns
of those British migrants who wish to delineate and/or curtail British cultural identity through
performative and symbolic display. In this process, British ethnicity is positioned as ‘other’—
although certainly not as ‘alien’—to the national mainstream.
Britfest, like the numerous public festivals of ethnicity in Australia that simultaneously
celebrate cultural distinction and national incorporation, offers a historically specific reaction
to the re-imagining of the nation. This article examines this new expressive tendency within
the context of recent debates about Britishness in Australia, and explores the ramifications
for identity formation and cultural affiliation among British migrants. By locating this analysis
in the Melbourne suburb of Frankston, we aim to provide a situated example of the ways in
which British ethnic identities are being negotiated. Such localised and specific responses,
however, are operating within and are influenced by the broader context of shifting
representations of a diverse British diaspora. Like British-Australians, members of this diaspora
also inhabit nations shaped by the legacies of British imperialism, colonisation and migration.
Shifting meanings of Britishness also represent and inform a more general ‘crisis of white-
ness’, indicating how culturally embedded the colonial equation of Britishness with whiteness
has been for those who imagine themselves at the core of the contemporary Australian nation.
Locating british identity
Recent scholarship has tracked, traced and positioned contemporary expressions of British
identity in Australia in relation to a variety of cultural, social and geographical spaces and
moments.4 Frankston has not attracted attention thus far, but it is no accident that it has
hosted Britfest since the festival’s inception in 1999. With a population of around 100,000,
—
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Aboriginal (and Japanese) societies. But, given that Japanese ex-divers tell stories
such as ‘Aboriginal women had the rut’, one cannot ignore the racism and sexism among
Japanese men.51
Global implications of australian colonialism
It was not only Anglo-Celtic Australians who came to this continent and made an ‘enormous
fortune’ by exploiting Aboriginal people, their lands and seas. It was also the Japanese—and
Chinese, Malays, Filipinos and many other people from overseas—who came to Australia
without the consent of Indigenous people, and often took their forturnes back to their home
countries.52 This is not just a story of the past, or just a story of the pearl-shell industry.
For example, many Japanese eat ‘Aussie Beef’, one of the most important Australian export
products and one which derives from an industry established and developed by using cheap
or unpaid Aboriginal labourers.53 The highly politicised Indigenous activism related to Jabi-
luka uranium mine relates not only to Australia but also to Japan, because Japanese electric
companies plan to buy uranium from this mine.54 To sum up, it is not just Anglo-Celtic Aus-
tralians, nor all Australians including Asian Australians, who are responsible for the colo-
nial (and postcolonial) exploitation of Indigenous people and their lands. Australian coloni-
sation has ‘global implications’—historical and contemporary—for which both Australians
and non-Australian are responsible. In this very context, Aboriginal reconciliation must cross
national boundaries.
Here we face complex problems related to the ‘responsibility’ of the ‘historical subject’.
For example, who should take responsibility for the colonial exploitation by Japanese labour
migrants in the nineteenth century? Are ‘all Japanese’ responsible for this, or only those and
their families who migrated to Australia? What about Japanese Australians who migrated
here last year? And how are they expected to take ‘responsibility’ for it?
These questions bring us to an arena similar to (the so-called) ‘Rekishi Shutai’ Ronso (‘His-
torical Subject’ debate), which has been a matter of controversy among liberal democratic–
minded scholars in Japan. The debate’s central focus is postwar responsibility of Japan(ese).
This paper does not intend to introduce the debate in full, or to intervene in this contro-
versy.55 But, in order to criticise the ways in which Aboriginal reconciliation is used to unite
Australia(ns), and in a search for ‘open reconciliation’, I believe this debate is highly suggestive.
After briefly sketching the debate, I would like to introduce Tessa Morris-Suzuki’s notion of
renrui (implication) and Toshio Nakano’s argument on shutai no bunretsu to kousou (the fissured
subject and its conflict) and develop a theoretical perspective on possible ‘open reconcilia-
tion’ which de-nationalises (or globalises) Aboriginal reconciliation.
In 1995, Norihiro Kato, a cultural and literary critic, published an article titled ‘Haisengo
ron’ (‘Japan After Defeat’). Kato argued that both left-wing liberal intellectuals and right-wing
—
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‘fudge with flair’, scones and ‘Rob’s British and Irish Butchery’, specialising in ‘British
Gammon, Haggis, Irish Boiling Bacon, Pork Pies, Walsh Faggots, Black Pudding and much,
much more’. There’s a Scottish clan-and-tartan stall suggesting you ‘look for your clan here’;
there’s the Varangian Guard’s ‘medieval’ tent, with soldiers and their smock-clad families,
and even Shetland pony rides nearby. The Victorian Re-enactment Society have provided a
wizened Queen Victoria as well as a pearly king and queen. Also evident are a Punch and
Judy show, beefeaters, British ‘bobbies’, various guardsmen, a Welsh witch, the ‘Front
Parlour—specialising in country-ware gifts and English china’, a cake stall run by the ‘Blitz
Brits’, and an assortment of second-hand oddments arranged under the banner ‘Steptoe’.
The entertainment program also features the Frankston Returned Servicemen’s League
Pipes and Drums, a late afternoon ‘singalong’ and ‘twelve different British beers’ on tap in
the football clubrooms. Every so often a cannon is wheeled out and space is cleared for a
never entirely successful firing. As the day wears on, it becomes evident that some of the
highlights of previous Britfests—including the Merseyside Association of Victoria with their
T-shirts and banner (‘a swelling river, a rising tide, my heart, my pride, my Merseyside’) and
a ‘Beauty Contest for British Bulldogs’ (‘no humans eligible’)—have not braved the heat
to appear.
Notwithstanding the absence of bulldogs, Britfest with its re-creation and representa-
tion of Britishness provides an entry point for investigating the complex meanings within
the transitional narratives of migrancy, ethnicity and ‘belonging’ among British migrants in
modern Australia. The identification and promotion of Britishness at this event reflects recent
trends in the re-imagining of that Britishness, which has also become the focus of popular
and scholarly debate.1 In much of this debate, events such as Britfest are seen as represen-
tative of a newly emergent sense of identity among British migrants—as an organic reawaken-
ing of community pride, nationhood and sense of (an often privileged) place in Australia.
The renegotiation of Britishness upon which these assessments are based has emerged
during a period that has seen forms of repression of many other symbolic and civic expres-
sions of Australian migrant identities. The most prominent attempts at repression have been
of those constructed as ‘other’, ‘ethnic’ or ‘illegal’ by a ‘core’ who imagine themselves as being
within and representative of the national ‘mainstream’. As Ghassan Hage and others argue,
the public spaces for migrant and ethnic identity in Australia are constantly monitored by
members of this mainstream, who worry that the spaces ‘ethnics’ inhabit may threaten their
‘fantasy’ of a white national identity of Anglo-Australian origin. While certainly not a
new phenomenon in a nation that has been historically anxious about immigration and
race, recent responses to issues such as border control, national security and ‘ethnic tension’
have constituted and occasioned newly effective strategies to repress the legitimacy of some
migrant identities.2
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nationalists failed to face the ‘warp’ of the postwar Japanese psyche. On the one hand, left-
wing intellectuals cannot acknowledge the historical fact that the famous Article Nine of the
Constitution declaring the renunciation of war was imposed by the US occupation forces.
On the other hand, right-wing nationalists do not face the obvious fact of the Japanese
emperor’s war responsibility. Because of this ‘warp’, the Japanese have failed to establish a
collective subject of ‘we the Japanese’ that can be responsible for war crimes against Asian
nations during the Second World War. Therefore, Kato urges the establishment of a ‘col-
lective national us’ in order to sincerely apologise to the Asian nations.56
Many liberal intellectuals in Japan found it difficult to accept Kato’s arguments because of
his highly controversial (neo)nationalistic discourse. In particular, those working on decon-
structing ‘the Japanese national subject’ argued that the Japanese could take responsibility
for the previous war crimes only when they unmake their Japaneseness as the national sub-
ject. However, these deconstructionists have also been criticised as ‘irresponsible’ on the
ground that one cannot deconstruct Japanese identity when Asian war victims name ‘the
Japanese’ as the accused.57
How can these debates affect reflections on Aboriginal reconciliation in Australia? As I
remarked in the early part of this article, it is important to recognise and emphasise the his-
torical responsibility of Australia as a colonial nation-state. There should be no doubt about
the need for ‘national reconciliation’ in decolonising Australia through the promotion of
Indigenous legal rights and overcoming the numerous disadvantages that many Aboriginal
people still suffer. But, if the final and only destination of Aboriginal reconciliation is the re-
establishment of a ‘united Australia’ or the ‘collective national subject’, then the process of
reconciliation will become a closed national ritual. Such a ‘closed reconciliation’ tends to
standardise different historical positionalities (for instance, between Anglo-Celtic whites and
postwar Asian migrants) and fabricate the national memory.
What about claiming that the Japanese migrants are responsible for the Australian
colonisation as Japanese migrants? For example, in 1998 the Japan Club of Australia pub-
lished Osutoraria no Nihonjin: Isseiki wo Koeru Nihonjin no Kiseki (Japanese in Australia: Japan-
ese Footprints over a Century) which narrates a history of the Japanese in Australia from the
nineteenth century to the present.58 In the introduction, the editor wishes for Japan–
Australia friendship by ‘passing on the precious records of Japanese (in Australia) over a cen-
tury to the next generation’.59 If, as the Japan Club seems to want, one wishes to establish
the ‘Japanese in Australia’ as a historical subject, then Japanese Australians today must as a
collective historical subject—‘Japanese migrants’—be responsible for what pre-war Japanese
pearl-divers did in northern Australia.60 But, this extension of responsibility is nothing other
than what Anderson calls ‘long distance nationalism’.61 If one aims to regard both the
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Britfest, february 2001
It’s the third annual Britfest in Frankston—a city by name but known in Melbourne as the
outermost suburb at the south-eastern end of the metropolitan train line. The location is the
Frankston Football Oval, just outside the town centre. It’s late February and the tempera-
ture is approaching its projected maximum of 38 degrees Celsius. There’s not much shade
on the expanse of the parched and browning oval, and many have sought relief under the
veranda of the raised wooden grandstand. Here festival-goers can catch the breeze blowing
across Port Phillip Bay and look out over Olivers Hill towards the beach, reminding them-
selves that, despite the best efforts of town planners to obliterate its existence, people ini-
tially moved to Frankston to be ‘beside the seaside’.
On a small stage in the middle of the football field, Rose Romeo has just finished her
‘Recitations’, her place taken by branch members of the United Kingdom Settlers’ Association
who don Regency costumes to perform country dances. The average age of participants
appears to be about sixty. Just to the side of the stage another group is gathered, possibly
awaiting the upcoming ‘Knobbly Knees Contest’. According to the Britfest program, this will
be followed by a dance by the Britannia Morris Men, the playing of Scottish bagpipes and
then a ‘Varangian Guard battle’.
Apart from the stage entertainment, viewers in the grandstand can also see, ranged around
the edge of the playing field, stalls—no more than twenty—selling a range of goods identified
as British; promoting clubs, societies and interests identified as British; and selling food
‘proudly’ identified as British. There are cups of tea, ploughman’s lunches, fish and chips,
beauty contest for british bulldogs?
SARA WILLS AND KATE DARIAN-SMITH
—
Negotiating (Trans)national Identities
in Suburban Melbourne
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specific words used to describe things. For instance, mum’s prawning net was always
‘handwoven’ even if it wasn’t, and dad’s hair always ‘crinkled in sooty black waves’. As if in
the telling of its details it could prove, or at least preserve, its veracity. And despite the fact
that my parent’s relationship was scarred by difficulties—and that I know for a fact my
father’s teeth were false, having lost them all before the end of his malnourished teenaged
years because of rickets—the story still lives, as a strange heightened fiction, passed on by
word of mouth. I remember it for its sound, the almost tangible vibrations it created
during the strange symbiosis of speaking and listening, and for the things that occurred,
as often happens during the best music, in the silences and the gaps between words.
It was my father’s love of storytelling that made it memorable. His speech possessed the
necessary cadence for it. And being the children of musical parents we possessed all the
necessary imagination to take it that little step further and make it so. And so the
collusion (and collision) of fact, symbol and the obtuse meaning, a phrase which I will
purloin from Barthes and for the purposes of this essay call the ‘musical’ meaning, create
this family fable. The resonance of the ‘musical’ meaning, rather than the facts it might try
to communicate, is brought to life by language, the ‘notes of literature’, and as in music,
by rhythm, timbre, volume, speed and texture. And if, as Barthes writes, the obtuse or
‘musical meaning can be seen as an accent’, an ‘accent not directed towards meaning …
(or even) an elsewhere of meaning’,5 then my father, husband of a musical wife and dad to
five musical kids, played the accents of his narrative like a maestro, and played us,
through this particular story, like a one-man band, so that we ‘oohed’ and ‘aahed’ in all the
right places, at moments of drama, tension, romance and resolution, in harmony and as
soloists.
Mother, you know the story
My mother never had as much time to listen to my father’s stories as I did. Despite her
background as a singer and performer in operas and operettas, she was, for the most part,
too busy cooking and keeping order in our ramshackle house overrun with books and
children. She did, however, have a few stories to tell of her own. But rather than speak her
stories, she sang them, first of all, in foreign languages I didn’t understand: German,
French, sometimes Italian and, once or twice, Spanish. She would eventually form her
own strong views on singing in a language that we, her audience, did not know. ‘The
words’, I would hear her admonish her singing students time and time again. ‘The words
are what you are communicating. Remember. We MUST understand the words!’
I remember her stirring a stew over our second-hand stove, with its badly wired hot
plates and food-encrusted sides. Suddenly, in clear bell-like English, she bellowed out
through bursts of steam:
—
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pre-war Japanese pearl-divers and the contemporary Japanese migrants, who may have
just arrived in Australia last year, as the unitary historical subject then, yet again, we witness
the fabrication of the national memory.
I believe that the limitations of setting up the three historical subjects of ‘Anglo-Celtic
(whites)’, ‘Asian migrants’ and ‘Indigenous Australians’ have become clear by now. As I have
demonstrated in this article, we need to constantly re-categorise historical subjects such as
‘British’, ‘Anglo-Celtic (Anglos and Celtics are not the same!)’, ‘whites’, ‘postwar migrants’,
‘Asian’, ‘Japanese’, ‘Malays’, ‘non-Indigenous’, ‘non-British’ and so on, according to the con-
text of what it is we want to address. As Curthoys correctly points out, ‘our conceptual frame-
works remain inadequate to our attempts at historical understanding’.62 It is precisely at this
point that I want to introduce Toshio Nakano’s idea of Shutai no Bunretsu (the fission of the
subject) in his engagement with the ‘Historical Subject’ debate in Japan:
‘Responsibility’, especially war responsibility and postwar responsibility can only be fulfilled
not by the establishment of the ‘subject’, but rather in the direct opposite, by the fission of
the subject, or more precisely speaking, by bringing conflict within the ‘subject’ and making it
politicised.63
What does Nakano mean by ‘fulfilling war-responsibility by fission of the “subject” ’? Citing
Chantal Mouffe and Judith Butler, he sees a fundamental problem with the very notion of
‘the unitary subject’.64 According to Nakano, fulfilling war responsibility means ‘to put an
identity on this “I” which has been maintained without any doubt of innocence in danger’.65
To my mind, what makes his argument different from previous deconstructionists is that,
instead of naively praising the plural/relational subjectivity which tends to make the ‘respon-
sibility to respond to the other’ ambiguous, Nakano calls for fissuring the subject in the process
of political conflicts.66 Nakano’s argument has its roots in the notion of ‘implication’ explored
by Tessa Morris-Suzuki:
‘Implication’ means the existence of a conscious connection to the past, but also the reality
of being (in a legal sense) ‘an accessory after the fact’. It is the status of those who have not
stolen land from others, but who live on stolen land; the status of those who have not partici-
pated in massacres, but have participated in the process by which the memory of those mas-
sacres has been obliterated; the status of those who have not injured others, but allow the
consequences of past injury to go unaddressed. Implication means that the prejudices which
sustained past acts of aggression live on into the present, and will lodge themselves in the
minds of the present generation unless we make the effort to remove them. We who live
in the present did not create the violence and hatred of the past. But the violence and hatred
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in the psychological context of his culture. I will merely
present this narrative in order to distinguish the three
levels of meaning that Barthes saw. The first ‘informational’
level, the one that communicates,2 sets the scene, introduces the characters, placing them
in time by their clothes and perhaps their haircuts. There is a grown man, a young girl,
some prawning nets, a river and, amidst all of it somewhere, a message. The second
‘symbolic’ level, the one that, according to Barthes, signifies,3 is no longer open to the
science of the message but to the sciences of the symbol, the symbols here being that of
love, attraction, age and youth, the light of my mother’s youthful hair and complexion
versus the dark brooding looks of my father, and beside them, the ageless river winding
through the landscape down towards the inevitable sea. And the third level? Here I will
digress from Barthes’s model, dealing as it does with the visual image, and treat the story
as an oral narrative, a story that is simultaneously being told and listened to, what might
be described as a sonic or aural image.
This third level, the one that exceeds the ‘simple existence of the scene’,4 as well as its
symbolic resonance, compels what Barthes refers to as a ‘poetical’ grasp, which I take to
mean the obtuse, inexplicable reasons why the story still endures in my memory. I cannot
say now that I particularly believe in it, even that it is true. Its existence is not dependent
on factual communication, and its symbolism is only rich to those who may wish to see it
that way. I remember it because it was told to me, I remember it because of how it was told
to me, simply, poetically, musically, with a reverence for its details. There were always
Uncle Charlie and his wife, Aunty Kath,
at mum and dad’s coast house.
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of the past, to some degree, created us. It formed the material world and the ideas with
which we live, and will continue to do so unless we take active steps to unmake their
consequences.67
This notion of ‘implication’ makes it possible to shift our focus from ‘the past colonial
injustice’ to ‘the present postcolonial everyday facts’ that are deeply rooted in our historical
understanding of the past. Referring to Morris-Suzuki, Nakano argues it is precisely
the moment of being accused of ‘Japanese (war) responsibility’ that a ‘Japanese’ realises the
implication of the past injustice in ‘her/his’ everyday facts. When I hear the voice of the injus-
tice of the past directed to myself, ‘I’ fissures itself between ‘I’ that exists as a ‘Japanese’ and
‘I’ who holds a critical gaze to the fact that ‘I exist as a Japanese’. Without this fission, ‘I’ can-
not recognise the ‘implication’ of the past that ‘I’ am responsible for today. Therefore, ‘fission
of the subject’ means political commitment to unmaking the consequences of past violence
in response to the war victims’ accusation today.68 In other words, colonial injustice is not
only an ‘unfinished business’ from the past, but is also quite literally ‘alive’ in our everyday
lives of the present.
For open and global reconciliation
In calling for ‘open reconciliation’ with the Indigenous people of Australia, I believe it is
necessary to promote the ‘fission of the (historical) subject’ in order that ‘responsibility’ and
‘implication’ come together in ways that make past injustices visible and unmake continuing
injustice. This will be a multi-layered process. First, in order to commit to ‘open recon-
ciliation’ as Australians, the ‘Australian subject’ needs to be fissured. And then, if one is ques-
tioned about the implication of past injustices under categories such as ‘Japanese’ or ‘post-
war migrants’, the historical subject of ‘Japanese’ or ‘postwar migrants’ needs to be fissured
by acknowledging the past and by politicising it in the present. Each of us has a unique multi-
layered subject position in which we live with a particular condition of ‘implication of the
past’ in our everyday lives. Whether one is an Australian, Japanese or Indigenous person, a
student, business person, young woman or old man, each of us may need to realise the impli-
cation of the past in our everyday life and make our subjectivity fissured and politicised in
order to set up ‘open and global reconciliation’ along with ‘closed and national reconciliation’.
The colonisation of Australia, which violently exploited Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islanders and their lands, holds global implications of the past (and present) injustice. For
example, as a person who eats Aussie beef, whose ethnicity and citizenship are the same as
Japanese ex-divers in Australia, as a sojourner who lives in Australia and who as a historian
produces discourses related to Aboriginal historiography, I am responsible for unmaking the
past (and present) injustice of Australian colonisation. This is because the ‘global implications
—
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Uncle Charlie eventually owned all the souvenir shops in the Hilton Hotel chain. He
was a crabby old bastard, stingy with his money and his love. But when he told his stories
he became momentarily part of the magic of the signified, as well as the magic of the
signifier, being both narrator and participant in his stories.
My father was a Christian Brother for thirty years and eventually was appointed head of
the Strathfield Seminary in charge of all the young religious men in Australia, until he
walked out one day, leaving his charred dinner burning in a saucepan, to be replaced, he
loved to tell us ruefully, by the soon-to-be-famous writer Morris West. Or so this
particular myth goes. Coping with the shame of failing at his vocation, he became, after
several nervous breakdowns, a Latin and English teacher at various grammar schools, a
husband to a much younger bride and, eventually, an elderly father to me and my four
brothers and sisters.
As a father he was the age of most of my contemporaries’ grandfathers and, in some
cases, great-grandfathers. And despite his robust physique—in some old photos he
resembles that famous picture of Picasso in his Y-fronts—he told stories like an old man,
full of humour, wisdom, pathos, and all the genuinely unsettling details of a life lived,
from our perspective anyway, in an unimaginably distant past, a long long time ago.
One of my father’s favourite stories was of how he met my mother. This is a tale I
remember far more vividly than any that was read to me, or any that I read. My mother,
golden haired, ruddy cheeked, sits on the banks of the West End side of the Brisbane
River. It is a silvery spring day and she is dragging her nets out into the water. She loves
the solitude of prawning, even though she is only twelve, and her brother, who will
eventually become the captain of the Wallabies Rugby Union team, is up at the house
making a racket with his footie mates. My father, who—depending on who’s telling the
story—looks like a young Montgomery Clift, Dana Andrews, Tyrone Power or a mid-
career Fredric March, is on his way to mum’s house to tutor her brother. He stops and
talks to her. She tells him about prawning, about throwing the nets out wide and dragging
them in slowly, about waiting, about the wash of the waves from the ferries that chug
between the banks of the river. He smiles, dazzled and dazzling. The sun glints off his
perfect teeth, and whatever serendipity existed in the skies above West End that day
beamed down on my future parents.
A triumvirate of meaning
In his notes on the Eisenstein film Ivan the Terrible in Image-Music-Text, Roland Barthes
distinguishes three levels of meaning in stills from the silent classic. I will make no
attempt to deconstruct this family narrative from the point of view of my father’s position
—
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of Australian colonisation’ have clearly shaped my everyday life. Therefore, what a historian
can do for ‘open reconciliation’ is, I believe, to make such implications of the past visible.
Studying the histories of Aboriginal–Asian relations in Australia is just one of many possi-
ble approaches to promote this alternative mode of Aboriginal reconciliation. To participate
in this, it is irrelevant whether or not one is a ‘true Australian’.
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I receive a third meaning—evident, erratic, obstinate … exceeding psychology, anecdote,
function, meaning … this third meaning is that of significance …
In the classical paradigm of the five senses the third sense is hearing. This is a happy
coincidence, since what is here in question is indeed listening … listening bears within it
that metaphor best suited to the ‘textual’: orchestration, counterpoint, stereophony.
Roland Barthes1
Ben and the art of storytelling
My father, whose name was Ben, loved telling stories. I wish I could say it was the Irish in
him, but he was a Mancunian by birth, a brooding Celt by ancestry and a migrant
Australian. It was from his storytelling sessions with my Uncle Charlie that I first
understood Pythonesque one-upmanship. These competitive narratives consisted of
colourful descriptions of shoeless boys collecting firewood in the snow while daddy
became emphysemic in a coalmine and mummy planned their exodus to Australia. In
these sessions, matriarchs fight back tears while burying a succession of choleric children,
patriarchs swear off the booze in a pact with God that involved, at the very least, the
survival of the remaining offspring.
These were the first ideas I formed of life in another place and time, and from these two
old raconteurs, who liked to outdo each other in their colourful and not altogether
nonfictional retelling of their shared history, I learned not only about making stories but
about listening to them.
the sound of the invisible
L INDA NEIL
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